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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETH S. LEWIS, ) 
) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THOMAS G. PIKE, individually, ) 
THE LOCKHART COMPANY, a Utah ) 
Industrial Loan Corporation; ) 
and AMERICAN BANKERS LIFE ) 
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, ) 
a foreign corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants- ) 
Respondents. ) 
Case No. 18195 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff (appellant) against 
defendants (respondents) for recovery due to an alleged failure 
to obtain credit life insurance on the life of plaintiff's 
(appellant's) husband in connection with a loan. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' (respondents') Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard on December 3, 1981. The District Judge, Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, granted a summary judgment in favor of defendants 
(respondents). Judgment was entered on December 15, 1981. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents ask that· the summary judgment entered in this 
matter be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Application for Loan from Lockhart by Lewis' 
In early summer 1979, application was made by Darrel E. Lewis 
and Beth S. Lewis for a loan from The Lockhart Company ("Lockhartn) 
in the amount of $18,000. (Beth s. Lewis Deposition, pp. 22-23, 
hereinafter "Lewis Deposition"). Prior to July 2, 1979, Mr. 
Thomas Pike of Lockhart contacted Mr. Lewis to discuss a matter 
relative to the Lewis' home (not related to the $18,000.00 loan) 
as Lockhart was then receiving the payments on the contract pur-
suant to which the Lewis' were purchasing the home, which 
payments at one time were going through Tracy-Collins. (Lewis 
Deposition, p. 28). It was during thiq conversation that Mr. 
Lewis inquired about Lockhart making an $18,000 loan so that Mr. 
Lewis could consolidate all of his debts into one and in said 
conversation Mr. Lewis made arrangements to visit with Mr. Pike 
about it at the Lockhart offices. (Lewis Deposition, pp. 23; 
26) • 
Thereafter, Mr. Lewis met with Mr. Pike at Lockhart. As to 
family financial affairs, Mrs. Lewis testified in her deposition 
that while she and her husband discussed matters, her husband 
-2-
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would " •• more or less handle mattera." (Lewis Deposition, p. 
23). Mr. Lewis was familiar with lending matters as he had at 
one time been a branch office manager for a finance company. 
(Lewis Deposition p. 8). At the time that the Lewis' were 
seeking the $18,000 loan from Lockhart, Mr. Lewis was a financial 
programmer at Hill Field. (Lewis Deposition pp. 6-7). Mr. Lewis 
returned home after the meeting with Mr. Pike with a loan appli-
cation, and thereafter most of the signature page of the loan 
application was typed by Mrs. Lewis, and the document was exe-
cuted by both she and her husband (Lewis Deposition, pp. 24-25, 
29 and 30; Lewis Dep., Exh. 1). 
Loan Closing 
On July 2, 1979, both Mr. and Mrs. Lewis went to Lockhart to 
meet with Mr. Pike concerning the closing of the $18,000 loan. 
{Lewis Deposition, p. 31.) This meeting lasted approximately 30 
minutes during which the loan documents were executed. (Lewis 
Deposition, p. 34). As each document was presented for execu-
tion, Mr. Pike explained it to the Lewis'. (Lewis Deposition, p. 
34). Among the documents executed by the Lewis' was an 
"Assignment of Contract", "Notice of Right of Recission", a Trust 
Deed, and a document entitled "Disclosure Statement" (Lewis 
Deposition p. 32-40; Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
-3-
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In the Disclosure Statement executed by both Mr. and Mrs. 
Lewis, the loan charges were computed. No charges for credit 
life insurance were included in the Disclosure Statement at the 
time of execution. (Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 5, 6). This disclo-
sure form signed by the Lewis' specifically provides in boldfaced 
capital letters that "credit life & disability insurance is not 
required to obtain this loan. No charge is made for credit 
insurance & no credit insurance is provided unless the borrower 
signs the appropriate statement below." (Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 
5, 6). The "appropriate statement" in the form wherein one 
affirmatively indicates that they desire credit life insurance 
was not signed by the Lewis' and thus credit life insurance could 
not be included in the loan. (Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 5, 6). 
During this loan closing meeting, according to Mrs. Lewis' 
deposition testimony, Mrs. Lewis claims that she and her husband 
discussed between themselves whether it was necessary· to have 
life insurance on both of them or on Mr. Lewis. (R. pp. 36-40). 
It was during this alleged conversation with her husband alle-
gedly in front of Mr. Pike that Mrs. Lewis claims that she indi-
cated to her husband that she did not want a loan without 
mortgage insurance on her husband and that Mr. Pike allegedly 
indicated that they could let him know at a later date. (R. pp. 
36-40). According to the testimony of Mrs. Lewis, at the conclu-
sion of this discussion between Mr. Lewis and his wife, Mr. 
Lewis then turned and allegedly asked Mr. Pike if he could let 
-4-
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him know about the insurance and Mr. Pike said yes. (Lewis 
Deposition, pp. 37-40). Thus, at the loan closing, Mr. Pike was 
given no affirmative direction from the Lewis' to actually add in 
credit life insurance with the loan and the disclosure statement 
itself was executed by the Lewis' without insurance being 
included since no direction was given to include it. This is 
confirmed by Mr. Pike who states that he was never directed to 
add credit life insurance. (R. pp. 24-25). (Also, Thomas Pike 
Deposition, p. 28). 
Acceptance and Utilization of the Loan Proceeds by the Lewis' 
After the aforesaid July 2, 1979, closing and during the 
remainder of the month of July, 1979, the record discloses that 
no request for credit life insurance was made by either Mr. or 
Mrs. Lewis. Per the record, the only contact by either of the 
Lewis' during July with Lockhart and Mr. Pike after the closing 
on July 2, 1979, was when a check for the loan proceeds was 
picked up by the Lewis'. The $18,000 check issued by Lockhart 
and dated July 12, 1979, was made payable to both Darrel E. Lewis 
and Beth s. Lewis. (Lewis Deposition, Exh. 5-6). 
In her deposition, Mrs. Lewis testified that she was present 
with her husband when the check was picked up stating that 
. . • I feel I saw Mr. Pike that day and we were leaving for n 
California and Mr. Pike said to have a good trip. I did see him 
the day we went in and picked up the check and we were leaving 
-5-
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for California, and Mr. Pike said to have a good trip." (Lewis 
Deposition, p. 41). Mrs. Lewis also testified in her deposition 
that after the check was picked up, Mr. Lewis put it into the 
bank and that they then used the proceeds to pay debts. (Lewis 
Deposition, p. 36). The record is clear that at the time the 
check was picked up, no direction of any kind whatsoever was 
given to Mr. Pike or Lockhart to add in credit life insurance as 
there is no evidence in the record that the subject was even 
discussed when the check was picked-up. (Lewis Deposition, pp. 
36 and 41). (Pike Deposition, p. 41). 
The Period of Time After the Loan Proceeds Were Used 
Other than the picking up of the loan proceeds check with her 
husband in July, 1979, the appellant Mrs. Lewis never nad any 
further conversation or meeting with Mr. Pike until after her 
husband's death in September, 1979. (Lewis Deposition pp. 
40-41). Mrs. Lewis testified that her husband went in to see Mr. 
Pike in the early part of August, 1979, but that Mr. Pike was not 
in. (Lewis Deposition p. 42). She also testified that around 
the middle of August her husband tried to reach Mr. Pike on the 
telephone but he was not in. (Lewis Deposition pp. 44-46). 
Mrs. Lewis suggests in her deposition that Mr. Pike indicated 
that he (Pike) had not reached Mr. Lewis, but Mr. Pike's 
Affidavit states that he (Pike) talked to Mr. Lewis in late 
-6-
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August or early September, 1979. (Lewis Deposition p. 49; R. pp. 
24-25). However, even if one were to assume there is a dispute 
whether Mr. Pike talked to Mr. Lewis in late August or early 
September, 1979, there is no dispute that at least Mr. Pike tried 
to contact Mr. Lewis (Lewis Deposition, p. 49; Thomas Pike 
Deposition, p. 29). Further, it is clear that the record disclo-
ses no evidence that during this period of time (after July, 
1979), an affirmative direction to obtain credit life insurance 
was ever given by either Mr. or Mrs. Lewis to Lockhart. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS IT IS UNCON-
TROVERTED THAT INSURANCE WAS NOT 
REQUESTED AT THE TIME THE LOAN 
WAS CLOSED. 
A close and careful review of the record in this case shows 
that there is no material fact in controversy, thus substan-
tiating respondents' right to summary judgment as granted by the 
lower court. As is set forth in more particularity hereinafter, 
the appellant's attempt in her brief to demonstrate a factual 
conflict fails to reveal that such a conflict actually exists as 
to a material fact. 
-7-
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The appellant's complaint filed in this action alleges that 
the request for credit life insurance was made at the time of the 
negotiation and execution of documents: 
During the course of negotiation and exe-
cution of the loan application and disclosure 
statements, the plaintiff and her husband, 
Darrel Lewis, indicated to defendant Thomas 
Pike that they would like credit life 
insurance included in the loan transaction to 
be taken out on the life of Darrel Lewis, and 
requested defendant Pike to obtain the 
necessary insurance from the credit life 
writer utilized by defendant Lockhart, to wit 
defendant A.B.L.A. (R. p. 3) (Emphasis added) 
Then the complaint goes on to allege that "Subsequent to July 2, 
1979, the plaintiff's deceased husband made numerous efforts to 
confirm the inclusion of credit life insurance and to obtain the 
necessary premium figure to include in his monthly payment 
" (R. p. 3). (Emphasis added) 
The thrust of the appellant's allegations is that there was a 
definite request for credit life insurance made prior to or at 
the time the loan documents were executed on July 2, 1979, (the 
"closing") and then thereafter the so-called "efforts" of Mr. 
Lewis was to confirm the inclusion of the insurance. The grava-
men of the complaint is that the respondent Thomas Pike errored 
in not obtaining the requested insurance which was "allegedly" 
ordered prior to or at the closing. Plainly and simply, the 
record shows undisputedly that there was no request made for 
-8-
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insurance prior to the closing, and further, no request was 
actually made at the closing itself. 
A. Per Written Agreement, Insurance on the Life of 
Darrel Lewis was not Requested. 
There is no dispute that the closing loan documents were exe-
cuted by the plaintiff and her husband on July 2, 1979, (Lewis 
Deposition, p. 34). Further, admittedly each one of the docu-
ments executed by Mr. and Mrs. Lewis at the closing were 
explained to them by Mr. Pike. (Lewis Deposition, p. 34). 
Included among the closing documents wa~ the one entitled 
"Disclosure Statement", (Lewis Deposition, Exh. 5, 6). The 
disclosure document itself provides spaces wherein the com-
putations are set forth as to the loan charges. Credit life 
insurance computations were not included in the said spaces and 
thus the loan finance charges clearly did not include credit life 
insurance when the disclosure statement was signed by the Lewis'. 
Further, apart from the sections of the disclosure statement 
wherein the actual computed charges for insurance must be set 
out, there is also the following written in bold faced capital 
letters: 
CREDIT LIFE & DISABILITY INSURANCE IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THIS LOAN. NO CHARGE IS 
MADE FOR CREDIT INSURANCE & NO CREDIT 
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED UNLESS THE BORROWER 
SIGNS THE APPROPRIATE STATEMEN~ BELOW. 
(Emphasis in form and added). 
-9-
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Neither the appellant nor her husband ~igned the document in the 
space provided where it is necessary for one to elect to include 
insurance along with the additional cost. This, of course, makes 
the document inherently consistent since the costs for the 
insurance were not included in the mathematical computations 
showing the loan charges. 
The Disclosure Statement was explained and it was executed by 
the Lewis'. It is a binding agreement and an acknowledgement on 
the part of the appellant as well as her deceased husband con-
cerning the fact that no credit life insurance was requested at 
the time of the loan closing and thus none was included at the 
time in the loan charges. 
The execution of the disclosure form by the Lewis' concluded 
the matter as to there being no request for insurance. Any 
alleged prior negotiations or discussions as well as any contem-
poraneous discussions could not vary the terms of the written 
understanding. In the case of State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey et. 
al., 565 P.2d 413 (1977) the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
The court properly adhered to the prin-
ciple that when the parties have reduced to 
writing what appears to be a complete and cer-
tain agreement, it will be conclusively pre-
sumed, in the absence of fraud, that the 
-10-
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writing contains the whole of the agreement 
between the parties. Also, that parol evi-
dence of contemporaneous conversations, repre-
sentations or statements will not be received 
for the purpose of varying or adding to the 
terms of the written agreement. (p. 418) 
(Emphasis added) (See also Rainford v. 
Rytting, 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969)). 
At pages 8 and 9 of her brief, appellant argues that the por-
tion of the Disclosure Statement where it states "I do not want 
Credit Life or Disability Insurance" was not signed either. It 
is not required that this portion of the form be executed. 
Insurance is not added to a loan (including its extra cost) 
unless requested. If one wants insurance, it must be 
acknowledged and then the cost of such must be included in the 
disclosure. 
In her argument (Brief, pp. 8-9) appellant makes references 
to the deposition of Mr. Thomas Pike concerning this matter, 
which deposition is apparently not with the record and may not 
have been published at the lower court level. However, respon-
dents do not object to its full use. T~e reference by the 
appellant to Mr. Pike's deposition is incomplete and does not set 
out the proper context of his statement as to why one must sign 
if they want insurance, but don't need to sign if they don't want 
it. 
Appellant has overlooked Mr. Pike's testimony that it is an 
advantage to sell insurance as there is premium income. (Pike 
-11-
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Deposition, p. 41) Pike explains that the space provided to sign 
if one doesn't want insurance is not required in the disclosure 
form but is more of a marketing tool: 
Q. I presume that you must have had some 
conversation directly with Mr. and Mrs. 
Lewis regarding those two aspects before 
Exhibit 1 was prepared? (Exhibit 1 is 
the Disclosure Statement) 
A. That is true. 
Q. When did that conversation or conver-
sations occur? 
A. Again, it seemed to me we had several 
conversations between the time of making 
the application and actually finalizing 
it. When he determined how long he 
wanted the loan and when he wanted the 
insurance, we always came to an agreement 
and we did with Darrel in advance of the 
closing as to yes or no on the insurance. 
At that point in time there was not a 
decision to have insurance. There was a 
decision not to have insurance and that 
is why the disclosure was filled out the 
way it was. 
Q. Okay. Why wasn't the blank, then, for 
the signatures, affixed to the part of 
the application that says, "I do not want 
credit life insurance"? 
A. I'm just not sure totally in this case. 
This is done at the time of closing when 
we are together. 
Q. Let me ask this. Were you present at the 
closing? 
A. I was. 
-12-
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Q. Was anyone else from the Lockhart Company 
present? 
A. No. 
Q. The normal procedure of the Lockhart 
Company in the processing of loans where 
credit life is refused by, or I guess 
refused is the right word, by the 
borrower would be to complete this middle 
section of the form under "I do not want 
credit life or disability insurance" and 
to have the borrowers sign and date that, 
isn't it? 
A. Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. 
Q. Okay. Why would it not be? Why is it on 
the form? 
A. It is a marketing tool. That is why it 
is on the form and we like to use it. 
The other signatures that are called for 
there, Mr. Hintze, if they do want 
insurance, they must sign by law. So we 
have to - that has to be done. 
The other is very helpful of ten in 
helping someone to decide they want 
some insurance. (Pike Deposition, pp. 
20-21). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, to have insurance one must sign the form so indicating. 
The part that one may sign indicating no insurance need not be 
signed as it is a marketing tool. There is nothing in the record 
disputing this explanation. The disclosure form was completed 
and executed without requesting credit life insurance, and parol 
evidence is inappropriate as a written understanding came into 
existence. 
-13-
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B. Even If, Arguendo, Parol Evidence is Admissible With 
Respect to the Execution of Documents at the Closing, 
the Uncontroverted Evidence is Clear That There was no 
Request for Credit Life Insurance. 
Even if, arguendo only, one could suggest that parol evidence 
should be considered as to whether or not credit life insurance 
was requested on July 2, 1979, (even in light of the written 
disclosure statement wherein there was no election made for 
insurance) the testimony of the appellant makes it most clear 
that such was not the case. It only further substantiates the 
already clear written understanding, supra, that there was no 
request for credit life insurance. 
The appellant testified in deposition as follows: 
Q: And do you recall having any discussion with respect to 
this document that has been marked as Exhibit 5? 
(Referring to Disclosure Statement) 
A: Correct, yes. 
Q: First of all, I will ask you to identify who said 
anything about it. Not what, but who. 
* * * 
A: My husband and I. 
Q: Was the conversation you had in the presence of Mr. 
Pike? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: Now with respect to your husband, could you tell me what 
it was that he said and maybe first of all you could put 
it in quotation marks. 
-14-
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A: My husband and I discussed whether it was necessary to 
have life insurance on both of us or just himself, 
mortgage insurance on both of us or himself. 
Q: That was a discussion you had between yourselves? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Mr. Pike was present during that conversation? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What did you say to your husband? 
A: We felt we'd like to discuss it further, whether it 
was necessary to have it on me. 
Q: Is that something that you said to your husband, that 
you ought to discuss it further, or is that something he 
said to you? 
A: I said I feel we should discuss it further, whether it 
was necessary to have it on me or both of us. Is that 
what you were asking? 
Q: So you said you should discuss it further? 
A: Yes. 
Q: At another time? 
A: And get back with Mr. Pike on it. 
Q: Did your husband just agree with you, that you ought to 
discuss it later? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did either one of you express a feeling or indication at 
that time whether you ought to be covered or not? 
A: That's what we discussed, whether I should be covered 
also. 
Q: And it wasn't a case where one of you thought you should 
be covered and one thought you shouldn't be covered and 
you would resolve it later? 
A: No. 
-15-
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Q: Neither one of you knew for sure whether you ought to be 
covered? 
A: I felt that it wasn't necessary that I should be 
covered. 
(Lewis Deposition p. 37-39) (Emphasis added) 
Appellant further makes it clear that on July 2, 1979 - (closing) 
there was no actual direction for the credit life insurance to be 
included: 
A: Only that I definitely did not want a loan without 
mortgage insurance on my husba~d and Mr. Pike indicated 
that we could let him know at a later date whether it 
should be on both of us or just my husband and he would 
leave it open until he heard from us. 
Q: Now, is this something you said to your husband that Mr. 
Pike overhead, or --
A: Mr. Pike was there and heard the whole conversation. 
Q: So as you remember, then, can you remember any exact words 
that you would have said to your husband? 
A: Only that I felt it was necessary that he have mortgage 
insurance. 
Q: Do you recall anything your husband said to you? 
A: He felt the same way. 
Q: And what did he say? Do you recall anything that he 
actually said rather than what he felt? 
A: He turned and asked Mr. Pike if he could let him know 
and Mr. Pike said yes. 
Q: Is there anything else that you can remember that took 
place. 
A: No. 
(Lewis Deposition p. 39-40) (Emphasis added) 
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It is clear, then, even if one could consider parol evidence, 
that the appellant and her husband on July 2, 1979, did not 
direct that insurance should be included. Since there was no 
request per se, such could not be added into the loan charges. A 
lender in such a situation would have no prerogative to do so. 
So at the time the documents were executed, credit life insurance 
was appropriately not included as a component. 
Appellant's complaint allegations are not supported by the 
sworn testimony of the appellant. It is patently clear that at 
the time of the closing, (as well as prior thereto) no direction 
was given to include credit life insurance. 
POINT II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE EVEN 
IF, ARGUENDO, THERE WAS ANY QUESTION AT 
THE CLOSING AS TO WHETHER THE MATTER OF 
INSURANCE WAS LEFT OPEN, IT WAS PUT TO REST 
WHEN APPELLANT UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED THE 
LOAN PROCEEDS LATER THAT MONTH 
After the loan closing on July 2, 1979, the record discloses 
that there was no other contact from either Mr. or Mrs. Lewis 
with any representative of Lockhart during July except for the 
time that both of them met Mr. Pike briefly to pick up the 
$18,000 loan proceeds check. At the time the Lewis' picked up 
the proceeds (check dated July 12, 1979) the uncontroverted 
record is that nothing was said at that time about desiring to 
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have credit life insurance. Per the record, credit life 
insurance wasn't even a subject discussed. Plainly and simply 
the check was unconditionally picked up and the proceeds 
utilized: 
Q. And when would you have first seen the 
document or writing of which this appears 
to be a Xerox copy? 
A. We came in and picked the check up. This 
was approximately two weeks later after 
we applied for the loan. I'm sorry. I 
cannot tell you for sure. 
Q. You are not sure whether your husband 
picked this up 
A. No, I was with him. 
Q. Were you with him when the check was 
picked up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then with respect to this check do you 
recall also that it had the bottom por-
tion attached to the check? 
A. I am sorry. I really have to say I don't 
remember but I would say it did. 
Q. And then after you picked up that check 
what did you do with it? 
A. He put it in the bank and we made checks 
out on it to each one of the people that 
he had specified and paid off the debts 
that he had borrowed it for. 
Q. And where would it have been deposited, 
which bank? 
A. Zion's First National. 
Q. In Salt Lake City? 
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A. No, Bountiful. 
(Lewis Deposition, pp. 35-36). (Emphasis 
added). 
Later in her deposition, Mrs. Lewis confirmed her presence when 
the check was picked up and the record further shows that no 
request was made on that occasion for credit life insurance: 
Q. So you yourself never really saw Mr. 
Pike, then, before July 2, 1979 and 
September 17, 1979? 
A. Not as I recall. 
Q. I think you best remembered you went in 
to pick up the check and who would you 
have gotten that check from? I'm 
referring now to what's marked as Exhibit 
5. 
A. I do feel that I did see - I'm sorry to 
take it back but I feel I saw Mr. Pike 
that day and we were leaving for 
California and Mr. Pike said to have a 
good trip. I did see him the day we went 
in and picked up the check and we were 
leaving for California, and Mr. Pike said 
to have a good trip. 
Q. So other than that occasion you don't 
have any recollection of seeing Mr. Pike 
between July 2 and September 17? 
A. No. (Lewis Deposition, p. 41). 
In her brief the appellant ignores this material event. 
Appellant's complaint alleges that the request for insurance was 
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made at the closing if not before, and yet in her brief appellant 
seems to contradict her pleadings to suggest the issue was left 
open at the closing. Thus, ignoring the pleadings of the 
appellant and even assuming her contrary argument that the issue 
was left open on July 2, 1979, (the· closing), it was no longer 
left open on or about July 12, 1979, when the Lewis' picked up 
the proceeds check. 
Thus, even assuming that appellant is able to get around the 
executed written disclosure form and to be heard to argue that 
the matter was left open pending the Lewis' response, under 
applicable law the response was given t7 the Lewis' thus 
concluding a contract. Under principles of contract law, mani-
festation of assent " • may be either written or oral or by 
actions and conduct or a combination thereof •••• " Daum 
Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah 1952). The Lewis' 
unconditional acceptance of the proceeds was their clear and une-
quivocal response to and acceptance of the loan without credit 
life insurance. Appellant should not be permitted to ignore the 
unconditional acceptance, as even principles somewhat akin to 
estoppel would come into play -- " ••• conduct by one party 
which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
of action resulting in detriment or damage ef the first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct." Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 
572 P.2d 708, 712 (Ut. 1977). See also 31 C.J.S. §109. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Lewis took advantage of receiving the loan pro-
ceeds and applying them.to their benefic without any further com-
ment to Mr. Pike about credit life insurance. Mr. Lewis had been 
involved in the past in the lending business and thus borrowing 
matters were not something new to him. If the issue had been 
left open at the closing, arguendo, then by appellant's own 
actions, the proceeds were accepted without any direction given 
for insurance or any other condition. The Lewis' themselves 
closed any open issue by their own assent and acceptance. 
POINT III. 
AS TO THE TIME PERIOD AFTER THE DISBURSAL OF THE 
LOAN PROCEEDS IN JULY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH 
COULD BE CONSIDERED BY A TRIER OF FACT TO ESTABLISH 
THERE HAD BEEN A REQUEST FOR CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE 
AND THUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
As set forth, supra, the complaint states that a request for 
the insurance was made at the time of the execution of the docu-
ments, if not before. Discussion by appellant concerning later 
contacts really goes beyond her own pleadings. However, even if 
the appellant may get around her pleadings, there is no evidence 
which could be considered by a trier of fact concerning a request 
for credit life insurance during the period of time after the 
loan proceeds had been disbursed, accepted and utilized in July, 
1979. 
First, any "open" question about whether insurance was to be 
included was put to rest when the Lewis' elected to accept the 
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proceeds and utilize them without their requesting it. Second, 
during the period after July, 1979, it is uncontradicted in the 
record that appellant herself never made any contact with Mr. 
Pike nor attempted to do so. Further, in the argument under 
Point III in her brief, appellant asserts that Mr. Lewis would 
not necessarily be the agent of his wife. Assuming appellant's 
own argument, any attempt by Mr. Lewis to contact Lockhart after 
the disbursal of the loan in July, 1979, was irrelevant as it was 
not an attempt on behalf of Mrs. Lewis and thus appellant herself 
clearly made no attempt to contact Lockhart after receiving the 
benefit of the loan proceeds. Per the record, appellant never 
made any contact of any kind or nature whatsoever with Lockhart 
until after the death of her husband. The record is also absolu-
tely clear that appellant never asked Lockhart to contact her 
after she got the loan proceeds. Thus, during the latter period 
(after the loan disbursal in July, 1979), appellant has nothing 
about which to complain as she herself did nothing in her own 
behalf and no duty was placed on Lockhart as the loan was closed 
and disbursed. 
Now, assuming, arguendo, that the appellant is not held to 
the argument made in Point III of her brief and appellant may 
rely on her husband as her agent in trying to contact Lockhart, 
there is still nothing after July, 1979 on which a claim can be 
based. Mr. Pike in his affidavit states that in late August, 
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1979, or in early September, 1979, he did in fact talk to Darrel 
Lewis " ..• and gave him certain information about credit life 
insurance •••• " (R. pp. 24-25). Although Mrs. Lewis in her 
deposition suggests that Mr. Pike had indicated in a conversation 
with her in September, 1979, that he had not reached Mr. Lewis, 
she does state in her deposition that Mr. Pike said that he had 
tried to reach Mr. Lewis. (Lewis Deposition p. 49, Pike 
Deposition, p. 29). 
Even if one were to assume that ther.e may be a question as to 
whether or not Mr. Pike actually talked to Mr. Lewis in August or 
September of 1979, there is no conflict in the record that at 
least Pike attempted to contact Lewis. However, there is still 
no evidence of any kind whatsoever in the record that any direc-
tion was given in a note or otherwise to Mr. Pike that credit 
insurance was to be instituted. The note referred to by 
appellant in her brief (pp. 5 and 11) does not say "add 
insurance" nor does it contain any other such language requesting 
insurance.!/ 
1/ Further, Mr. Pike explains in his deposition that 
insurance after the loan is closed, other further 
ment execution is then required of the borrowers 
was clearly never accomplished. (Pike Depositio~ 
34-37). 
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Appellant attempts to argue that the lower court was using 
the note referred to in appellant's brief to establish the truth 
of the contents in the note, thus allegedly being contrary to the 
hearsay rule. The note is not even necessary in the granting of 
the summary judgment, as argued, supra. However, based upon the 
objective theory of contracts, the note at face value only makes 
a request for information and nothing else. Even assuming 
appellant's argument that the note shouldn't be accepted as indi-
eating that appellant didn't want insurance, i.e. that it 
shouldn't be considered to show appellant's negative intent, it 
still does not by any stretch of interpretation state that 
insurance was wanted or that it should be added. On its objec-
tive face, the note clearly is not a request or direction for 
insurance. Thus, there is nothing in the record showing a 
request for insurance and there is nothing showing that respon-
dents violated any duty. 
POINT IV. 
LOAN WAS PAID WITHOUT 
RESERVATION OF ANY RIGHTS 
In her deposition, appellant admits that in latter September, 
1979, she knew there was no credit insurance. (Lewis Deposition, 
p. 46). With this knowledge, appellant paid off the entire loan 
balance in November, 1979. (Lewis Deposition, p. 50-52). 
According to the deposition testimony, at the time of the payoff, 
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there were no conditions or reservations made by Mrs. Lewis with 
respect to the payment and thus payment was unconditionally made. 
(Lewis Deposition, p. 50-52). Such action is contrary to 
appellant's asserted claim thus a giviug up or waiving of any 
alleged claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The action of the lower Court in granting summary judgment 
should be sustained. No direction for insurance was given at the 
closing and the appellant got the benefit of the loan proceeds 
and gave no direction for insurance at said time. No duty was 
violated by the respondents. There is no material issue of fact 
in the matter justifying the time and expense of a trial. The 
lower court's action was proper. 
DATED this ;{9;3ay of April, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gif for • \ rice 
Greene Ca lister & Nebeker 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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